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The formal differentiation of (i) pain incentives from ordinary rewards, (ii) of effortful from careful
production and (iii) of diligent from slothful workers under labour market imperfect competition
ultimately suggests that the optimal menu of contracts associates inducements to production kinds
following the preference triggered by slothful workers: effortful production with pain incentives and
careful production with ordinary rewards. The efficiency of the efficiency wage as interpreted by the
sociological theory is therefore discerned to arise under a particular production kind and so is that of
slavery its dual (undoubtedly illicit). More broadly, the confusion of the two production kinds under
market and state capitalism respectively contributes to the Phillips curve and price rigidity, in the
misapplication of ordinary rewards to effortful production. State capitalism jurisprudentially eliminates
the risks of dismissal and redundancy and thereby lastly causes effortful production to enter stagnation.
JEL classification codes: D02; D24; D41; D42; D86; E11; E12; E13; E23; E31; E32; J41; N20; N30; O43;
P10; P20; P22; P30; P37; P51; P52.
MSC codes: 91B24; 91B38; 91B40; 91B44; 91B55.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Fenoaltea on slavery. Stefano Fenoaltea [3] rationalised slavery as an uncertain and transitory
mechanism of exchange between backward and developed areas, trading slaves after wherewithal and prior
to foodstuffs in return for manufactures, as bilateral price and real wage readjustments and transportation
costs might allow. Fenolatea [2] had also argued pain incentives and ordinary rewards as optimal respective
contracts for effortful and careful production. If slavery were to have ever started, he can be consequently
synthesised to have held, unbeknownst to him or not, it would have ended through the bilateral real
wage readjustment due to the exhaustion of the slave populations in the backward areas, at constant
transportation costs, net of the accidental underpinnings1 and short of abolition; foremost, it would have
ended in spite of its contractual optimality relative to the effortful production for which it would have been
perdurably employed, all else again equal.
1.2 Our view. The Arab slave trade’s persistence unto contemporary abolitionism, however, contradicts
Fenoaltea’s [3] Boserupian mechanism. Upon having gauged feudalism and the Atlantic slave trade too, as
Fenoaltea [3] himself had worked towards the formulation of his model, we [4] thus objected reasoning that
slavery is not Boserupian and that it would have temporarily ended wherever dechristianisation had arisen,
perduring in its absence and eventually restarting in those lands no longer Christian, to last indefinitely
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1With regard to the Atlantic slave trade, for instance, he [3] posited remittance technology development as the counterfactual
drive behind its cessation. In other words, according to him [3], had it not been abolished the Atlantic slave trade would have
ended, on account of market forces, because of the development in telecommunications enabling emigrant remittances, which
would have continued to finance foreign manufactures, accidental to his [3] theory of bilateral real wage readjustments and
transportation costs stability.
worldwide. Demand for manufactures from developed areas was not the drive behind the slave trades, we
[4] argued, but the supply of slaves itself, ever of appetite in view of fallen human nature and instrumental
towards the goal of dechristianisation; similarly, wherewithal and foodstuffs were not inter-temporal export
substitutes for slaves on the backward area’s part, to our [4] mind, but intra or inter-temporal complements,
at constant transportation costs.
In such a light the end of feudalism in Protestantised Europe features a robust explanation, as do
(i) the continuation of the Arab slave trade, whose world was never Christian, to our postmodern age
and (ii) contemporary globalisation. Similarly, the Atlantic slave trade is counterfactually held to have
continued unbound and precisely on account of the reason we [4] surmised are Fenoaltea’s [2] pain incentives
as optimal contracts for effortful production deemed perdurable. From an alternative perspective, even
if slavery is optimal for effortful production and even if that effortful production is to remain in place
greater interests suggesting slavery’s abandonment could be at stake, which we [4] contended being those of
dechristianisation.
The substance of slavery’s persistence, in sum, seems tied to the incentive mechanism extensively
underlying slavery (e.g. dechristianisation, Boserupian trade), whereas its accidents appear to concern
slavery’s contractual expedience in relation to production kind on account of the said mechanism.
1.3 Contributions. Since Fenoaltea’s [2] prescription is most proximate to the efficiency wage literature
but yet singularly lacks a mathematical formalisation we have hereby made it our task to strive supplying it.
The efficiency wage literature to which it speaks, in case, is in the seminal acceptation of Robert Solow [6]
and therefrom George Akerlof and Janet Yellen [1] (i.e. the sociological theory). His [2] contract menu in
fact specifies the sufficient (and perhaps necessary) conditions under which the efficiency wage is effectively
efficient, thereby advising against all of its misapplications and attendant repercussions in abstract and
historical time; the same holds for slavery its dual. We thus hereby intend to add noteworthy remarks
relative to historical applications and theoretical deductions of the efficiency wage theory (and more) as
declined above.
2. Inducement, production and worker differentiation
2.1 Scourging and wages. Let us posit a production function f : R → R with output y ∈ R, first
degree homogeneous and twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave in labour input function
l : R2+ → R+ and labour augmenting technology function t : R
2
+ → R; let t be increasing and concave in
scourging and wages2 s, w ∈ R+; let l be decreasing s, increasing in w and concave in both: f ◦ tl : R
2
+ → R
in y = f [t(s, w)l(s, w)] such that, ∀α ∈ R, f [αt(s, w)l(s, w)] = αf [t(s, w)l(s, w)], f [t(s, w)l(s, w)] ∈
C2, fl, t > 0, (fl, t)l, t < 0, ts, w > 0, (ts, w)s, w < 0, ls < 0, lw > 0 and lss, ww < 0.
For clarity: f ’s first degree homogeneity captures constant returns to scale and its increase and concavity
in l and t mimic diminishing marginal returns; the labour augmentation of t is known as Harrod neutrality;
the increase and concavity of t in s and w model pain incentives and ordinary rewards, respectively, with
a natural ceiling on elicited productivity; the respective decrease and increase of l in s and w and its
concavity therein model a monopolistic labour supply setting an implicit markdown upon s and an implicit
markup upon w in the provision of l, deceleratively approached, relative to what marginal cost s and w at
full employment would otherwise yield3.
s is representative of pain incentives and therefore entails the threat of dismissal or, more broadly, of
the risk of losing the means for the acquisition of subsistence; w are representative of ordinary rewards and
therefore entail bonuses and ad hoc schemes of motivation, more broadly. It follows that pain incentives
and ordinary rewards cannot perfectly substitute each other, even if production were not delegated, for
effortful production requires different inducements from careful production, but more anon.
2s, w ∈ R could alternatively apply, although redundantly, for negative s and w respectively represent w and s on the
positive line, that is, the worker respectively enjoys appropriation and suffers exploitation.
3Production is not necessarily delegated, as the acting principal could preorder non-marginal cost pricing himself, even
though it be improbable (being masochistic) in the event of an implicit s markup or w markdown (i.e. monopsonistic labour
demand) whereby l increases in s and decreases in w, all else equal. The virtue of diligence, opposed to the deadly sin of sloth,
theoretically permits such a scenario, but it is ultimately clear that marginal cost s and w at full employment hinge upon
the compromise between leisure and labour, on tastes and preferences, and that its alteration is a structural modification
of societal norms and customs, fundamentally tied to the observance of no less than the natural law and thus impossibly
relativistic.
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2.2 Costs and profit. The firm is institutionally representative of all producers, that is, across all
particular activities in time and space. Firm nominal profit is normally Π = py − Wl(s, w) − F,
where p ∈ R++ are prices, W = pw nominal wages and F ∈ R++ is a fixed cost, but since both F
and the variable cost, which prices l, are hereby functions of s and w they are directly formulated in
real terms and so is firm profit therewith. Real variable cost4 c : R2+ → R is non-increasing in s,
increasing in w and concave in both: c
p
≡ c(s, w) such that cs ≤ 0, cw > 0 and css, ww < 0. Real fixed
cost C : R2+ → R++ is increasing and concave in s and w :
C
p
≡ C(s, w) such that Cs, w > 0 and
Css, ww < 0. c and C are thus twice continuously differentiable and first degree homogeneous: c, C ∈ C
2
and, ∀α ∈ R, αc(s, w) = c(αs, αw) and αC(s, w) = C(αs, αw). Real profit Π
p
is thus the difference
between y, l valued at c and C : Π
p
= y − c(s, w)l(s, w)− C(s, w).
For clarity: the non-increase and concavity of c in s model bounded exploitation, that is, as s rises c
can either remain constant or even fall, although meeting a floor5; the increase and concavity of c in w
can be instantiated as taxation breaks, that is, as w rise c increases, but the firm could eventually enjoy
taxation rebates; the increase and concavity of C in s and w model bounded supervision and negotiation
costs, respectively, that is, hired labour features higher supervision costs than rented capital and rented
capital features higher negotiation costs than hired labour6 and as s or w rise to account for hired labour
or rented capital C increases, though ever less, for supervision or negotiation is eventually formalised (i.e.
internalised in cost).
2.3 Optimal solutions. The firm therefrom determines the optimal solutions for s and w whenever the
partial derivatives of Π
p
with respect to both be null, meaning changes are suboptimal. Since s and w are
non-singular and the profit equation is concave the unconstrained maximisation problem is both necessary
and sufficient for optimal solutions.




= f [t(s, w)l(s, w)]− c(s, w)l(s, w)− C(s, w).
2) Marginal product of scourging. ∂Π
p∂s
= 0←→ f ′(tsl + tls) = (csl + cls) + Cs; since c ∈ R, l ≥ 0, cs ≤
0, ls < 0 and Cs > 0 we note that
7 f ′(tsl + tls) > 0 if and only if: (i) −Cs < csl + cls < 0←→ csl + cls ∈
(−Cs, 0); (ii) −Cs < csl + cls = 0; (iii) −Cs < 0 < csl + cls ←→ csl + cls ∈ (0, ∞). Positing c, l > 0,
ceteris paribus, f ′(tsl + tls) > 0 if and only if csl + cls ∈ (−Cs, 0).
3) Marginal product of wages. ∂Π
p∂w
= 0←→ f ′(twl + tlw) = (cwl + clw) + Cw; since c ∈ R, l ≥ 0, cw >
0, lw > 0 and Cw > 0 we note that
8 f ′(twl + tlw) > 0 if and only if: (i) −Cw < 0 < cwl + clw ←→
cwl + clw ∈ (0, ∞); (ii) −Cw < cwl + clw = 0; (iii) −Cw < cwl + clw < 0 ←→ cwl + clw ∈ (−Cs, 0).
Positing c, l > 0, ceteris paribus, f ′(twl + tlw) > 0 if and only if cwl + clw ∈ (0, ∞).
Assuming positive c and l to begin with (i.e. the real variable cost is borne and labour is thus present):
the marginal product of s is positive if and only if the partial derivative of l priced in real terms with
respect to s is negative, but greater than the negative partial derivative of C with respect to s (i.e. the
decrease of priced l must exceed the negative increase of supervision costs); the marginal product of w is
positive if and only if the partial derivative of l priced in real terms with respect to w is positive. Such is
intuitive; for positive c and l : the decrease of l in s, suggesting lower y, is compensated by the decrease of
c in s, outweighing the increase of C in s; the increase of c in w is compensated by the increase of l in w,
producing higher y.
In a word, given positive c and l : if pain incentives rise then in order for y to increase priced l must
decrease and more than offset the increase of supervision costs; if ordinary rewards rise then in order for y
to increase priced l must increase.
4W is paid in currency and is therefrom a fraction of the positive nominal money supply MS : W ∈ MS ⊂ R++.
Consequently, c models the fraction of the real money supply mS =
MS
p
paying the worker: c ∈ mS ; the real variable cost
would normally be w, but because it is also affected by s it is modelled more generally.
5For instance, the worker is not paid his increased marginal product, but the same or ever less, unto starvation; eventually,
he could be even stripped of his belongings, which have a limit.
6Hired labour is consequently suitable over short periods, for supervision costs require little amortisation, and rented
































2.4 Effortful and careful production. Let us differentiate effortful from careful production such that, all
else equal, for effortful production ef it arises that t is increasing in s, non-increasing in w and concave in
both and for careful production cf it arises that t is non-increasing in s, increasing in w and concave in
both:
f [t(s, w)l(s, w)] =
{
ef [t(s, w)l(s, w)], ts > 0, tw ≤ 0, tss, ww < 0
cf [t(s, w)l(s, w)], ts ≤ 0, tw > 0, tss, ww < 0
,
ceteris paribus. ef and cf are such that pain incentives and ordinary rewards are respective apposite
inducements therefor: yef = ef [t(s, w)l(s, w)] and ycf = cf [t(s, w)l(s, w)] are best induced through s
and w, respectively. The firm can be consequently divided into two institutional components, effortful and







= yef − c(s, w)l(s, w)− C(s, w)
Πcf
p
= ycf − c(s, w)l(s, w)− C(s, w)
.
2.5 Optimal differentiated solutions. All else equal, the differentiated unconstrained maximisation
problems are necessary and sufficient for optimal solutions.





= ef [t(s, w)l(s, w)]− c(s, w)l(s, w)− C(s, w)
Πcf
p
= cf [t(s, w)l(s, w)]− c(s, w)l(s, w)− C(s, w)
.
2) Marginal products of scourging.
∂Πef
p∂s




cf ′(tsl + tls) = (csl + cls) + Cs; since cs ≤ 0, ls < 0 and Cs > 0, positing c, l > 0, we note that:
ef ′(tsl + tls) > 0 if and only if −Cs < csl + cls < 0←→ csl + cls ∈ (−Cs, 0);
cf ′(tsl + tls) ≤ 0 if and only if csl + cls ≤ −Cs < 0←→ csl + cls ∈ (−∞, −Cs].
3) Marginal products of wages.
∂Πef
p∂w




cf ′(twl + tlw) = (cwl + clw) + Cw; since cw > 0, lw > 0 and Cw > 0, positing c, l > 0, we note that:
ef ′(twl + tlw) 6≤ 0, since 0 < cwl + clw ≤ −Cw < 0, thus, ef
′(twl + tlw) > 0 if and only if −Cw < 0 <
cwl + clw ←→ cwl + clw ∈ (0, ∞);
cf ′(twl + tlw) > 0 if and only if −Cw < 0 < cwl + clw ←→ cwl + clw ∈ (0, ∞).
Positive c and l are again assumed to begin with. The marginal product of s for ef and the marginal
product of w for cf are positive at the same necessary and sufficient conditions. The marginal product of
s for cf is non-positive if and only if the partial derivative of l priced in real terms with respect to s is
negative, but at most equal to the negative partial derivative of C with respect to s (i.e. the decrease of
priced l is at most exceeded by the negative increase of supervision costs); the marginal product of w for
ef cannot be non-positive since the partial derivative of l priced in real terms with respect to w is positive,
but at most equal to the negative partial derivative of C with respect to w, which is negative. Such is
intuitive; for positive c and l : s and w respectively induce yef and ycf as though production were not
differentiated; for cf the decrease of l in s, suggesting lower y, is compensated by the decrease of c in s,
though insufficiently outweighing the increase of C in s; for ef the increase of c in w is compensated by the
increase of l in w, producing higher y, all the same.
In a word, given positive c and l : if pain incentives rise then in order for y to increase priced l must
decrease and more than offset the increase of supervision costs, though only for ef, as pain sabotages care
altogether; if ordinary rewards rise then in order for y to increase priced l must increase, even for ef, as
rewards facilitate effort withal.
2.6 Diligence, sloth and type marginal products. Let us differentiate diligent from slothful workers such
that for the probability space (Ω, Θ, ρ) : Ω is the sample space; Θ = {θD, θS} ⊂ P(Ω) is the σ-algebra;
ρ : Θ→ [0, 1] is the probability measure originating the probability mass function ρi = ρ(θi), ∀i = D, S,
with ρi ≥ 0 and
∑S
i=D ρi = 1.
Diligent workers operate as though production were not differentiated such that pain incentives perfectly
substitute ordinary rewards9. For positive c and l, the positive marginal product of s of the diligent worker
thus equals his positive marginal product of w, notwithstanding production kind:
ef ′(tsl + tls) = ef
′(twl + tlw) > 0 if and only if csl + cls ∈ (−Cs, 0) and cwl + clw ∈ (0, ∞);
9Such workers are pleonastically diligent owing to the virtue of diligence; in fact, they could be said to be diligently resigned.
More broadly, they are so because of that which Catholic doctrine terms the gifts of fortitude and fear of God, respectively
produced by enlightened human will and the Spirit of God.
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cf ′(tsl + tls) = cf
′(twl + tlw) > 0 if and only if csl + cls ∈ (−Cs, 0)
10 and cwl + clw ∈ (0, ∞).
Slothful workers operate according to production differentiation. Under ef it is the case that t is
increasing in s, but non-increasing in w, consequently, for positive c and l, the marginal product of s of
the slothful worker exceeds his marginal product of w, which is positive; under cf it is the case that t is
increasing in w, but non-increasing in s, consequently, for positive c and l, the marginal product of s of the
slothful worker is non-positive and exceeded by his marginal product of w, also positive:
ef ′(tsl + tls) > ef
′(twl + tlw) > 0 if and only if csl + cls ∈ (−Cs, 0) and cwl + clw ∈ (0, ∞);
cf ′(tsl + tls) ≤ 0 < cf
′(twl + tlw) if and only if csl + cls ∈ (−∞, −Cs] and cwl + clw ∈ (0, ∞).
2.7 Optimal contracts. All else equal, the adverse selection (i.e. hidden information) relative to the
worker type produces a necessary and sufficient unconstrained maximisation problem for optimal solutions
and contracts.
1) Non-linear programming problem. max
{sD, S , wD, S}
Π
p
= ρDf [t(sD, wD)l(sD, wD)] +
ρSf [t(sS , wS)l(sS , wS)]−ρDc(sD, wD)l(sD, wD)−ρSc(sS , wS)l(sS , wS)−ρDC(sD, wD)−ρSC(sS , wS).
2) Marginal products of scourging. ∂Π
p∂sD, S
= 0←→ ρD, Sf
′(tsD, S l + tlsD, S ) = ρD, S(csD, S l + clsD, S ) +
ρD, SCsD, S and ρD, S ∈ (0, 1], ceteris paribus −→ f
′(tsD, S l + tlsD, S ) = (csD, S l + clsD, S ) + CsD, S .
3) Marginal products of wages. ∂Π
p∂wD, S
= 0←→ ρD, Sf
′(twD, S l + tlwD, S ) = ρD, S(cwD, S l + clwD, S ) +
ρD, SCwD, S and ρD, S ∈ (0, 1], ceteris paribus −→ f
′(twD, S l + tlwD, S ) = (cwD, S l + clwD, S ) + CwD, S .
The (expected) marginal product of s of the diligent worker equals his (expected) marginal product of w
if and only if the sum of his (expected) partial derivatives of priced l and C with respect to s equal the sum
of those with respect to w : f ′(tsD l + tlsD ) = (csD l + clsD ) + CsD = (cwD l + clwD ) + CwD = f
′(twD l + tlwD ),
for ρD ∈ (0, 1]. For diligent workers there thus emerges indifference between pain incentives and ordinary
rewards, between the hire of labour and the rent of capital, to the end of inducing production, be it effortful
or careful.
The (expected) marginal product of s of the slothful worker is greater or smaller than his (expected)
marginal product of w if and only if the sum of his (expected) partial derivatives of priced l and C with
respect to s is respectively greater or smaller than the sum of those with respect to w : f ′(tsS l + tlsS ) =
(csS l + clsS ) + CsS ≷ (cwS l + clwS ) + CwS = f
′(twS l + tlwS ), for ρS ∈ (0, 1]. Specifically,
f =
{
ef −→ f ′(tsS l + tlsS ) > f
′(twS l + tlwS )
cf −→ f ′(tsS l + tlsS ) < f
′(twS l + tlwS )
.
For slothful workers there thus emerges preference between pain incentives and ordinary rewards,
between the hire of labour and the rent of capital, to the end of inducing production: if production is
effortful then preference yields to pain incentives and the hire of labour; if production is careful then
preference yields to ordinary rewards and the rent of capital.
The indifference between inducements for diligent workers allows for the association of s and w with
yef and ycf , respectively, as required by the optimal inducements of slothful workers; the optimal menu of
contracts is consequently (yef , s) and (ycf , w) : if production is effortful then labour is hired and workers
face pain incentives; if production is careful then capital is rented and workers face ordinary rewards.
Deductively, in the acceptation of the sociological theory, cf is a sufficient (and perhaps necessary) condition
for the effective efficiency of the efficiency wage and ef is a sufficient condition for the efficiency of slavery
its dual.
3. Historical and theoretical remarks
3.1 Labour market perfect competition. The introduction of perfect competition on the part of labour
demand and supply simplifies f = ef, cf such that y = f [t(s, w)l] and l ∈ R++, all else equal. The
absence of monopolistic labour supply hereby allows for marginal cost pricing such that l cannot decrease
if s rises or w fall (i.e. no implicit s markdown or w markup) and l can no longer be therefrom reduced
to no employment, full employment being indeed enjoyed. Under ef and cf the price of l is ever W, on
account of perfect competition in the labour market: in real terms, workers are assumed to bargain the fair
pay of their marginal products in exchange for marginal cost s and w, themselves driven by the absence
10Specifically, cf ′(tsl + tls) > 0 if and only if −Cs < csl + cls < 0←→ csl + cls ∈ (−Cs, 0), ceteris paribus.
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of monopolistic labour supply11 and monopsonistic labour demand. The specific difference in relation
to labour market imperfect competition is that the real variable cost is no function of s, amounting to
w thereby12. Real profits are thus
Πf
p




= 0←→ lftts = Cs and
∂Πf
∂w




> 0 −→ Cs ∈ (0, ∞);
efttw 6> 0, since eft > 0 and tw ≤ 0, ceteris paribus, and efttw ≤ 0←→ 1 +
Cw
l
≤ 0 −→ Cw ≤ −l, but
Cw, l > 0 −→ 0 < Cw ≤ −l < 0, so y 6= ef [t(s, w)l], ceteris paribus, but y = ef [t(s)l];
cftts 6> 0, since cft > 0 and ts ≤ 0, ceteris paribus, and cftts ≤ 0←→
Cs
l
≤ 0 −→ Cs ≤ 0, but Cs > 0,
so y 6= cf [t(s, w)l], ceteris paribus, but y = cf [t(w)l];
cfttw > 0←→ 1 +
Cw
l
> 0 −→ Cw > 0 > −l −→ Cw ∈ (0, ∞).
The marginal products of s and w for ef and cf, respectively, are positive if and only if the partial
derivatives of C with respect to s and w are positive, that is, supervision costs and negotiation costs
respectively rise as labour is hired and capital is rented, as expected.
The marginal product of w and s for ef and cf, respectively, cannot be positive since the partial
derivative of ef and cf with respect to t is suitably positive and the partial derivative of t with respect to
w and s is suitably non-positive. The marginal product of w and s for ef and cf, respectively, can neither
be non-positive, however, for: (i) the partial derivative C with respect to w is no more than negative l,
but since l and the partial derivative of C with respect to w are positive either the latter or the former is
negative, contradicting either the assumption whereby negotiation costs increase in w or that whereby l
may not be reduced to no employment; (ii) the partial derivative of C with respect to s is non-positive, but
since it is positive it contradicts the assumption whereby supervision costs increase in s.
Consequently, for ef and cf it respectively arises that t is only increasing in s and w, all else equal. In
the presence of perfect competition in the labour market, in a word, the worker type adverse selection poses
no problem and the unconstrained maximisation problem for optimal contracts does not arise, being merely
a differentiated one, for the inducements of s and w which monopolistic labour supply prescribes as optimal
are naturally associated to ef and cf, respectively, that is, in exclusivity:
Πef
p
= ef [t(s)l]− wl − C(s) and
Πcf
p
= cf [t(w)l]− wl − C(w) only give rise to (yef , s) and (ycf , w), respectively.
3.2 Phillips curve, price rigidity and steady state. In what follows, unless otherwise outlined, the steady
state condition shall be synonymous with that of full employment, unlike in the Carl Shapiro and Joseph
Stiglitz [5] acceptation of the efficiency wage by which offered w exceed full employment (i.e. market) ones in
order for workers not to shirk, on the assumption that shirkers may be identified with a positive probability
and therefrom dismissed, being at once unable to be re-employed at full employment w, indicative of
shirking. As a consequence, offered w are arguably identified with steady state ones, thereby diverging
from full employment ones.
That clarified, we have seen that under ef and cf, all else equal, t only increases in s and w, respectively.
Now, the confusion of the two production kinds explains the misapplication of ordinary rewards to ef, the
contract menu (yef , w), that is to say, which after a negative demand shock gives rise to (i) downwards
stickiness and (ii) rigidity in prices under market and state capitalism, respectively. The contract menu
(yef , w) and the annexed confusion are respectively accidental and substantial under market and state
capitalism.
Under market capitalism a negative demand shock (i.e. lower quantity supplied) to yef decreases
the demand for l, which causes the marginal product of l to decrease in turn (i.e. lower opportunity
cost of production) and the excess supply of l to enter redundancy; the supply of l at such prospected
lower w ultimately increases (i.e. higher quantity demanded), allowing the workforce to return to full
employment, at even lower w (i.e. higher opportunity cost of consumption). If the supply of l immediately
accommodated the lower w then the aggregate supply function and the Phillips curve its dual would be
11It could be argued that monopolistic labour supply ought to eliminate slavery altogether and that even under labour
market perfect competition (whereby it would otherwise be present) it would hardly subsist, for neither employers would
consider it; employers are yet hereby contended to desiderate it because of fallen human nature, once again. The concomitance
of s and w is therefore not abstruse; moreover, it must be borne in mind that s are pain incentives touching not only the
outright scourge, doubtless illicit, but the broader risks of dismissal and redundancy as well.
12Under labour market imperfect competition employers certainly remunerate workers in real terms by means of w, but
their real variable cost is potentially decreased by s, as specifically outlined above; thence the pay being ultimately unfair.
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vertical, not respectively increasing and decreasing, that is, there would be no lag in readjustment, which
lag in readjustment (i.e. dismissal and eventual re-employment) is hereby posited to be precisely caused
by the unwillingness to sufficiently decrease w on the part of employers in view of their misapplication of
ordinary rewards to ef unbeknownst to them13.
The firm’s confusion of ef with cf specifically causes it to fear that said sufficient decrease in w may
give rise to such a fall in yef as that brought about under cf, which lowers full employment ycf by means
of t (i.e. the steady state is negatively altered), whereas yef would actually return to full employment.
Such a point was materially made by Fenoaltea [2] and only in part even by Solow [6], for the latter deemed
y increasing in w altogether, absent differentiating yef from ycf and thereby explaining why employers
might choose not to decrease w as contended by the former, but rather dismiss and eventually re-employ
at even lower, full employment w, that is to say: Solow [6] surmised y = f [t(w)l] and ft, tw > 0, ceteris
paribus. Downwards price stickiness can thus be hereby stated to be driven by employers, as opposed to the
commonplace of workers, but if it were not for such a contended mechanism the unwillingness in question
would be rather unlikely, nowadays especially.






























Note. The first graph depicts the contract menu (yef , w) under market and state capitalism, respectively being accidental and
substantial. Under market capitalism a negative demand shock to yef decreases l demand and w therewith (i.e. D
′ and w′), but
employers confuse yef with ycf and thereby refuse to sufficiently decrease w in order for lss to be preserved, fearing steady state yef
may fall as well as if it were ycf , which the second graph depicts (i.e. y
′
ss due to w
′, from steady state w). The l supply is therefore
not the flexible Sf , but the sticky Ss, the Phillips curve’s inverse, broadly speaking. The excess l supply is thus dismissed (i.e. l
′)
and eventually re-employed at lower w′ss, which both workers and employers have by then accepted, returning to lss through a rise
in l supply (i.e. S′s). Under state capitalism the negative demand shock decreases l demand, but since w are institutionally rigid
(i.e price rigidity, l supply Sr) lss and steady state yef permanently decrease (i.e. wss at l
′
ss); the workforce however remains fully
employed by statute, the excess supply whereof stands idle. Moreover, state capitalism’s substantial contract menu (yef , w) causes a
fall in s, no longer suffering the risks of dismissal and redundancy, which negatively affects yef through t, thereby being permanently






Under state capitalism nothing changes except for the fact that the excess supply of l does not enter
redundancy by statute, that is, ordinary rewards are institutionally misapplied, thereby causing full
employment yef to stagnate, until unemployment be allowed or price flexibility be reached even on the
part of workers (although unnaturally, societal norms and customs being again at stake). To be sure, the
supply of l at the new steady state permanently stagnates relative to that at full employment, namely,
despite the entire workforce remaining employed the excess supply of l stands idle.
In fact, the institutional misapplication of ordinary rewards to ef under state capitalism, that is, the
substantial contract menu (yef , w), gives rise to a negative change in s which the accidental contract menu
(yef , w) of market capitalism does not, for state capitalism’s labour market jurisprudence eliminates the
threat of dismissal and unemployment14, while market capitalism’s does not (i.e. the contract menu (yef , s)
substantially remains). The negative change in s which state capitalism triggers thus negatively affects
13Workers could themselves refuse the lower w even if employers sufficiently decreased w, thereby giving rise to unemployment
all the same: the two events are independent.
14As capital is rented by the state in view of effortful production negotiation costs do not arise, being there nothing to
intrinsically negotiate, but yef decreases. Instead of being subjected to the threat of dismissal, to wit, the instantiated
cultivator is inexorably paid his salary, is left unsupervised and entrusted with the demesne altogether, but because the public
landowner inspects the demesne negotiation costs are absent; the marginal product of his dismissal risk nevertheless decreases.
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steady state yef , exacerbating the intensive scarcity problem which so-called scientific socialism promised
to resolve by means of centralised production: −eftts < 0. Market capitalism’s dynamism is not therefore
accelerated with regard to subsistence technology by state capitalism, but sabotaged.
If a positive demand shock affected ycf under market capitalism then in view of the confusion of cf
with ef15 employers’ unwillingness to sufficiently increase w, whereby a rise in w does not affect yef , would
similarly give rise to a supply shortage of l, remedied through an expansion of the workforce by means of
immigration16, until they accommodate the higher w and return to steady state ycf at pre-immigration
l supply17; in fact, steady state ycf would actually increase, on account of employers’ belated rise in w.
Under state capitalism said supply shortage of l would be immediately accommodated at institutional w,
via international immigration, causing full employment ycf to permanently increase.
The institutional misapplication of pain incentives to cf by market capitalism’s labour market jurispru-
dence, by which the threat of dismissal and unemployment is transversal across production kinds18, offering
the substantial contract menu (ycf , s), contrarily excluded by state capitalism’s substantial contract menu
(ycf , w), does not give rise to a negative change in w, however, affecting not steady state ycf : −cfttw < 0
is not verified. An orthodox interpretation of the physiocratic school (i.e. state abstentionism even in worker
rights) thus features institutional anxiety, but does not thereby derail luxury technology, for cajolement is
present as well (optimally and not).

































Note. The first graph depicts the contract menu (ycf , s) and (ycf , w) under market and state capitalism, respectively, being (i)
accidental and substantial and (ii) substantial. Under market capitalism a positive demand shock to ycf increases l demand and w
therewith (i.e. D′ and w′), but employers confuse ycf with yef and thereby refuse to sufficiently increase w in order for lss to be
preserved, fearing steady state ycf may remain unvaried as if it were yef . The l supply shortage (i.e. l
′) is thus cleared through
immigration, which eventually recedes, the workforce returning to lss through a fall in l supply (i.e. S
′
s), at higher w
′
ss, which in
turn causes steady state ycf to rise, as the second graph depicts (i.e. y
′
ss due to w
′, from steady state w). Such is in contrast with
the Shapiro and Stiglitz [5] no shirking condition, depicted in the third graph: however much may l demand rise offered w will ever
exclude full employment (i.e. l′ at w′, on D′). Under state capitalism the positive demand shock increases l demand and since w
are institutionally rigid (i.e price rigidity, l supply Sr) lss and steady state ycf permanently increase (i.e. wss at l
′
ss).
A negative and positive demand shock to ycf and yef , respectively, under market capitalism absent
confusion in production kinds would moreover cause employers to (i) unwillingly decrease w, by contrast
necessary in order for steady state ycf to return, indeed ultimately lower precisely because of the decrease
of t in −w thereby, and (ii) willingly increase w to an analogous end, namely, the return of steady state
yef , indeed attainted to, t not being a function of w thereby. The same shocks under state capitalism
15The contract menu (ycf , s) is both accidental and substantial. In other words, ycf is optimally induced through w, but
being exchanged with yef the contract menu (ycf , s) accidentally arises; indeed, the transversality across production kinds of
the threat of dismissal and unemployment featured by market capitalism renders the contract menu (ycf , s) substantial as
well.
16Immigration could be intra or inter-sectoral, domestically or thereby from abroad.
17Immigration is implicitly surmised to recede, because of employers’ procrastination in sufficiently increasing w to the end
of accomodating risen demand.
18As labour is hired by employers in view of careful production supervision costs do not arise, being there nothing to
intrinsically supervise, and ycf does not decrease. Other than being paid his commission, to wit, the instantiated tailor is
entrusted with the fabric to be sewn, but because he infuses his skill into the fabric as the sewing progresses supervision costs
are absent; the tailor is not moreover imputed the risk of fabric damage, for it is not negotiated. The tailor is also subjected
to the threat of dismissal, but the marginal product of his commission does not thereby decrease.
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would finally only give rise to a negative and positive change in steady state ycf and yef , respectively, w
institutionally not even varying again.
4. Conclusion
In a setting of labour market imperfect competition the formal differentiation of (i) pain incentives
from ordinary rewards, (ii) of effortful from careful production and (iii) of diligent from slothful workers
suggests that: (i) diligent workers trigger indifference between pain incentives and ordinary rewards as
inducements for both effortful and careful production; (ii) slothful workers trigger preference for either
pain incentives or ordinary rewards as inducements for production in accordance with production kind,
being suitably effortful or careful. It furthermore suggests that the optimal menu of contracts thereby
associates inducements to production kinds following the preference triggered by slothful workers: effortful
production hires labour and prescribes pain incentives; careful production rents capital and prescribes
ordinary rewards. The efficiency of the efficiency wage as interpreted by the sociological theory is therefore
discerned to arise under (and perhaps only under) a particular production kind and so is that of slavery its
dual (impinging by no means on its illicitness, of course). More broadly, the confusion of the two production
kinds under market and state capitalism respectively contributes to the Phillips curve and price rigidity, in
the misapplication of ordinary rewards to effortful production. State capitalism jurisprudentially eliminates
the risks of dismissal and redundancy and thereby lastly causes effortful production to enter stagnation.
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